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Chenping Hou, Ling-Li Zeng, Dewen Hu
Abstract—With the evolution of data collection ways, it is possible to produce abundant data described by multiple feature sets.
Previous studies show that including more features does not necessarily bring positive effect. How to prevent the augmented features
worsening classification performance is crucial but rarely studied. In this paper, we study this challenging problem by proposing a
secure classification approach, whose accuracy is never degenerated when exploiting augmented features. We propose two ways to
achieve the security of our method named as SEcure Classification (SEC). Firstly, to leverage augmented features, we learn various
types of classifiers and adapt them by employing a specially designed robust loss. It provides various candidate classifiers to meet the
following assumption of security operation. Secondly, we integrate all candidate classifiers by approximately maximizing the
performance improvement. Under a mild assumption, the integrated classifier has theoretical security guarantee. Several new
optimization methods have been developed to accommodate the problems with proved convergence. Besides evaluating SEC on 16
data sets, we also apply SEC in the application of diagnostic classification of schizophrenia since it has vast application potentiality.
Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of SEC in both tackling security problem and discriminating schizophrenic patients
from healthy controls.
Index Terms—Augmented Features, Secure, Classification, Multi-view Learning
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Classification is a traditional and essential research area in
many fields, such as machine learning, data mining and
image processing. Classical methods, such as KNN, Naive
Bayes, Boosting and SVM all assume that the data are
represented by a unique feature set [1]. With the advent
of data collection ways, it is possible to collect abundant
data described by multiple distinct feature sets [2], [3], [4],
[5]. For example, images can be characterized by different
descriptors, such as SIFT, HOG etc. A piece of news can be
described by text, image, hyperlink etc. In medical image
analysis, the functional MRI (fMRI) image can be character-
ized by the image feature descriptors or the region-to-region
functional connectivity features.
In the literature, multi-view learning is a standard learn-
ing paradigm to manipulate data with distinct descriptions
[2], [3], [4], [5]. The heterogeneous features are regarded
as a particular view in multi-view learning. Rather than
requiring that all the examples have been comprehensively
described by a single view, it might be better to exploit
the connections between multiple views to improve the
performance. Up to now, there are a number of multi-view
learning algorithms and they have been combined with or
applied to various computer vision and intelligent system
problems. One can refer to [2] and [3] for a comprehensive
review of multi-view learning.
As to multi-view classification, there are many promi-
nent researches. Roughly, they can be categorized into three
groups. The first group is Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL)
[6]. Its original intention is to avoid the determination of ker-
nels in the classical Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier.
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If we learn a kernel in each view, MKL is naturally suitable
for multi-view classification. There are a lot of efforts have
been conducted on MKL. For example, Lanckriet et al.
have formulated MKL as the dual of a SVM problem and
solved it by a semi-definite programming [7]. Bach et al.
have proposed a block norm regularized MKL method [8],
Zien and Ong have learned a common feature space for
all the different classes and extended MKL for multiclass
classification (McMKL) [9]. The second group is based on
subspace learning. It tries to learn a subspace across differ-
ent views for classification. Farquhar et al. have integrated
KCCA and SVM into a single optimization formulation
and proposed SVM-2K [10]. Diethe et al. have extended
traditional Fisher Discriminant Analysis (FDA) by deriving
a regularized two-view equivalent of FDA and cast it to
multiple views FDA (MvFDA) [11]. Kan et al. have proposed
Multi-view Discriminant Analysis (MvDA), which seeks for
a single discriminant common space for multiple views in
a non-pairwise manner by jointly learning multiple view-
specific linear transforms [12]. The third group is based
on regression. For instance, the Subspace Co-regularized
Multi-View (SCMV) learning method [13] developed by
Guo et al. utilizes the regression model in the projected
common subspace of all views. Zheng et al. have proposed
the Multi-view Low-Rank Regression (MLRR) [14], which
combines regression model on each view by adding a low
rank constraint across different views.
Although these methods perform excellently in the re-
lated fields, they all focus on the utilization or extension of
traditional methods for multi-view classification. There are
still some fundamental issues should be aware. Before going
into the details, we would like to introduce the setting of one
experiment for demonstration and the results are shown in
Table 1. We have conducted experiments on data character-
ized in Table 2. The data named as AD1add2 means that we
take the first views of AD data on hand and the second view
of AD is regarded as new coming features, and similarly
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TABLE 1
Accuracy comparison between single view and double views.
Methods View No. Ionoshpere AD1add2 AD1add3
MLRR Single 0.7696 0.8381 0.8381Double 0.9098 0.7652 0.7234
MvFDA Single 0.9235 0.8658 0.8658Double 0.9292 0.8349 0.9173
MvDA Single 0.8531 0.8545 0.8545Double 0.9888 0.8714 0.8867
McMKL Single 0.9061 0.9015 0.9015Double 0.9718 0.9597 0.9455
for AD1add3. Four representative multi-view classification
methods from the above mentioned three categories, i.e.,
MLRR, MvFDA, MvDA and McMKL, have been employed.
For comparison, we take the first view of each data as
the input of these methods and the classification accuracy
is recorded in the line Single in Table 1. Correspondingly,
if both views of each data sets have been considered, the
results are listed in the line Double. We take 30% points for
training and the rest for testing.
As seen from above results, traditional methods cannot
guarantee that the utilization of new coming features could
always improve the performance. For instance, as shown
in Table 1, the performances of MLRR on AD1add2 and
AD1add3 degrade with more views. Similarly, MvFDA
also performs worse on AD1add2 when the second view
is added. One important reason may be that, whether
the utilization of new coming features will facilitate the
performance is closely related to the type of classifiers.
For example, as seen from the results in Table 1, MvFDA
performs better than MvDA on data AD1add3 whereas
the relationship is opposite on AD1add2. The same phe-
nomenon can also be observed from the results of MLRR on
Ionoshpere and AD1add2 data sets. Thus, how to design a
secure classifier, which guarantees that the performance does
not become worse with more features, no matter which type
of classifier is employed, is also worthy of investigation.
In this paper, we consider the question how to address
the above major and fundamental issue in multi-view learn-
ing. To the best of our knowledge, these questions have not
been thoroughly studied. Specifically, there are totally two
stages of our approach, i.e., Adaption stage (A-stage) and In-
tegration stage (I-stage). In A-stage, we train different types
of classifiers on the data in the first view and adapt all these
classifier by employing data in the new view. In I-stage, we
derive a final classifier based on adapted classifiers. With
weak assumption, it is guaranteed to perform no worse than
all the classifiers trained on the first view. In other words,
we design a secure classier.
We present a SEC (Secure Classifier) learning frame-
work. In A-stage, without domain knowledge about which
type of classifier performs best on data in the first view,
we employ several popular classifiers as the baseline
classifiers {f1, f2, · · · , fm}. When the new view comes,
we use new view data to adapt these classifiers to
{g1, g2, · · · , gm}, by only requiring the classifiers and their
predictions on the first view. The robust multi-class capped
`1 norm loss has been employed for adaption to reduce
the adaption bias. The balance between two views is also
determined automatically, without additional parameter.
In I-stage, SEC proposes to maximize the performance
gain of g , `(g1, g2, · · · , gm) against all the classifiers
in {f1, f2, · · · , fm}. The resultant new formulation is a
quadratic constrained linear problem, which is a well-
defined problem and can be solved by several state-of-art
optimization tools. We can also show that SEC is provably
secure and have already achieved the maximal performance
gain approximately with a mild assumption. Experimental
results on a broad range of datasets validate that SEC clearly
leverages the new coming features.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
(1) We propose the SEC approach to solve this crucial,
but rarely studied problem. As far as we know, this is the
first research about the secure classifier learning problem
with new coming features.
(2) We propose to tackle this problem in two-stage way.
In A-stage, we propose a new classifier adaption approach.
In I-stage, we present a new learning paradigm to derive
a secure classifier. We develop an efficient algorithm to
address the optimization problem and give theoretical anal-
yses about the security.
(3) A byproduct of our approach is that instead of
accessing the original data, only the classifiers and their
predictions on the first view are needed. Thus, it is a privacy
preserving approach as mentioned in [15].
(4) Except for systematical evaluation on 16 data sets
from a broad range, we also utilize our method in the
diagnostic classification of schizophrenia with MRI, which
has vast application potentiality. All the experimental results
indicate that our algorithm outperforms other compared
algorithms in almost all cases. It provides a new perspective
to investigate this problem and some useful guidance for
the researchers in this field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 will formulate this problem and we propose the SEC
approach and some theoretical results to guarantee the
security. The optimization of SEC is introduced in Section 3.
Experimental results on benchmark datasets are displayed
in Section 4, together with the application to diagnostic clas-
sification of schizophrenia with MRI. Finally, we conclude
this paper in Section 5.
2 THE SEC ALGORITHM
In our work, we focus on the learning problem in two
views. Concretely, we have data with one view on hand
already and another view being coming. Our main purpose
is utilizing the new-view data to train a secure classifier,
whose performance is never statistically worse than that of
the classifiers trained on the data on hand. Before going into
the details, let us introduce some notations at first.
2.1 Notations and Definition
Assume that {x(1)i ∈ Rd1}ni=1 and {x(2)i ∈ Rd2}ni=1 are
the training data points from two views respectively. Here
n is the number of training points, d1 and d2 are the
dimensionality of data in view 1 and view 2. The super-
script indicates the view index. Correspondingly, denote
{x(1)i ∈ Rd1}n+ti=n+1 and {x(2)i ∈ Rd2}n+ti=n+1 as the testing
points and t is the number of testing points. For simplicity,
the data matrix is denoted as X(1)tr = [x
(1)
1 ,x
(1)
2 , · · · ,x(1)n ],
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X
(2)
tr = [x
(2)
1 ,x
(2)
2 , · · · ,x(2)n ], X(1)te = [x(1)n+1,x(1)n+2, · · · ,x(1)n+t]
and X(2)te = [x
(2)
n+1,x
(2)
n+2, · · · ,x(2)n+t]. Denote the total num-
ber of classes as c. We employ the one-vs-rest binary coding
scheme to encode the class labels. In other words, the label
vector of training data x(1)i and x
(2)
i is represented by
yi ∈ {−1, 1}c×1, such that yi(j) = 1 iff x(1)i and x(2)i belong
to the j-th category and yi(j) = −1 otherwise. Then, the
label matrix is Ytr = [y1,y2, · · · ,yn] ∈ {−1, 1}c×n.
Definition 1. A classifier f is secure with respect to {fj}mj=1
means that the performance of f is never statistically significantly
worse than the best classification results of {fj}mj=1.
2.2 SEC Approach
We investigate the multi-view classifier learning problem
from new perspectives, i.e., secure. It is difficult to use
traditional approaches to achieve this goal directly. In our
paper, we tackle it in the following two-stage way.
1. In A-stage, we learn different types of baseline
classifiers, i.e., {f1, f2, · · · , fm}, on data with the first view
and then adapt them to {g1, g2, ·, gm} by utilizing new-
view data. They are various candidate classifiers to meet the
assumption of the following security operation in I-stage.
2. In I-stage, with security guarantee, we integrate
{g1, g2, · · · , gm} as g = `(g1, g2, · · · , gm) by approximately
maximizing the improvement in performance.
2.2.1 A-stage
In applications, different classifiers have different model
assumptions. It is difficult to design a unique classifier
which always achieves the best performances on all kinds
of data sets. To get a secure classifier, we first train different
types of classifiers on the data with the first view, i.e. X(1)tr
and Y, and adapt them using the new-view data.
Concretely, assume that the classifiers are denoted as
f1, f2, · · · , fm, where m is the number of classifiers. For
example, fj could be classification function of KNN, Re-
gression model, Naive Bayes, Boosting methods, SVM or
any kind of classifiers. When the new-view data, i.e., X(2)tr ,
comes, the most direct way is employing traditional multi-
view classification approaches as mentioned above. Nev-
ertheless, it may lead to at least two problems in using
this strategy. (1) Most of these methods require that all
the data, i.e., X(1)tr , X
(2)
tr and Y are already accessible. In
many applications, it may violate the privacy preserving re-
quirement [15]. For example, in image retrieval, researchers
can extract their own features of images as well as get the
retrieval results from other popular search engines, such
as Google. They cannot obtain the image features used by
Google. (2) Retraining the multi-view classifier is time and
storage consuming. In our paper, we will adapt the pre-
trained existing classifiers, i.e., f1, f2, · · · , fm, by only using
their predictions, without accessing the data X(1)tr .
Assume that the prediction of fj (j = 1, 2, · · · ,m) on the
first view’s training data x(1)i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is fj(x(1)i ).
Due to the privacy preserving requirement or the missing
of data in the first view, we can only get fj(x
(1)
i ), i.e., the
prediction of fj on x
(1)
i . In this case, since the classifier fj
is trained on X(1)tr , fj(x
(1)
i ) could approximate yi. When the
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Fig. 1. The plots of different loss functions. The abscissa is the value of
yigj(x
(1)
i ,x
(2)
i )− 1.
new representation, i.e., x(2)i , comes, we should train a new
classifier to approximate the training error between fj(x
(1)
i )
and yi.
Considering that the kernel trick is flexible and SVM is
one of the most popular classifiers, we assume that the clas-
sifier trained on x(2)i is W
TΦ(x
(2)
i ) + b, where W ∈ RD×c,
with D the dimensionality of high-dimensional mapping
space, is the transformation matrix, Φ(·) is the mapping
function and b ∈ Rc×1 is the bias. Now, the adapted
classifier on both x(1)i and x
(2)
i is defined as follows
gj(x
(1)
i ,x
(2)
i ) , λ1fj(x
(1)
i ) + λ2(W
TΦ(x
(2)
i ) + b). (1)
where λ1 and λ2 are two balance parameters, which will be
learned automatically.
For the convenience of presentation, we first focus on the
problem in two-class scenario. Since our goal is to utilize
x
(2)
i to obtain better classifier, the most popular loss metric
is the hinge loss. The definition is
`h(gj |x(1)i ,x(2)i )
= max(1− yigj(x(1)i ,x(2)i ), 0)
= max(1− λ1yifj(x(1)i )− λ2yi(wTΦ(x(2)i ) + b), 0),
(2)
where yi ∈ {−1, 1} is the class label of both x(1)i and x(2)i ,
w ∈ RD is the transformation vector. fj(x(1)i ) is the decision
value and b is the bias.
We would like to explain why we employ the hinge loss
in essence. As seen from Eq. (2) and the left plane in Fig.
1, in fact, we use yi(wTΦ(x
(2)
i ) + b) to approximate the
error 1 − λ1yifj(x(1)i ). If this value is small, it means that
we can classify the i-th training data by merely using x(1)i .
In this scenario, the hinge loss between them is small (less
than one) and we should not pay much attention to them.
Otherwise, if x(1)i is categorized into the wrong class, the
hinge loss is large and we need to use x(2)i to reduce the
approximation error. Briefly, the utilization of hinge loss has
roughly categorized x(1)i into correctly or wrongly classified
points and the hinge loss requires us to emphasize on the
wrongly classified points.
Whereas in traditional hinge loss, if the data point is
not correctly classified, the loss could be infinite. Since we
use wTΦ(x(2)i )+b to compensate the disagreement between
fj(x
(1)
i ) and yi. It will mislead the computation of w and b to
fit the largest disagreement. Recall the essence of classifica-
tion, we should focus on minimizing the classification error,
not the classification loss. Thus, we will trunk the larger loss
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and apply the capped hinge loss shown in the right plane in
Fig. 1 for adaption.
`ch(gj |x(1)i ,x(2)i ) = min(max(1− yigj(x(1)i ,x(2)i ), 0), 1).
(3)
To extend this loss into multi-class scenario, we use the
similar strategy as in [16], [17]. Concretely, the two-class
hinge loss in Eq. (2) can be reformulated as follows.
`h(gj |x(1)i ,x(2)i ) = min
mi≥0
|gj(x(1)i ,x(2)i )− yi − yimi|, (4)
where mi ∈ R is a slack variable to encode the loss.
Inspired by this reformulation, it is natural to extend
the binary capped hinge loss in Eq. (3) into the multi-class
scenario as follows.
`mch(gj |x(1)i ,x(2)i ) =
min( min
mi≥0
‖gj(x(1)i ,x(2)i )− yi − yi ◦mi‖2, 1) =
min( min
mi≥0
‖λ1fj(x(1)i ) + λ2(WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− yi − yi ◦mi‖2, 1),
(5)
where mi ∈ Rc×1 and mi ≥ 0 means that all the elements
of mi are non-negative. ‖ · ‖2 means the 2-norm of a vector
and ◦ is the pairwise product of two vectors.
By summarizing all the training error and adding a
regularizer, the objective function of adapting fj can be
formulated as
arg min
W,b,M≥0,λ1,λ2
λ‖W‖2F +
n∑
i=1
min(
‖λ1fj(x(1)i ) + λ2(WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− yi − yi ◦mi‖2, 1
)
.
(6)
Here, ‖ · ‖F is the F-norm of a matrix. λ is the pre-defined
parameter for regularizer. M ∈ Rc×n is a matrix with the
i-th column as mi.
There are several points should be highlighted here. (1)
Although the formulation in Eq. (6) seems complicated, we
will propose an effective strategy to solve it. (2) There is an
implicit function Φ in this formulation. We will show how to
tackle it by kernel trick. (3) There is only one explicit balance
parameter λ. We will tune it by cross validation.
2.2.2 I-stage
In A-stage, we have adapted all the on hand classifiers
{fj}mj=1 to their adaption version {gj}mj=1 shown in Eq. (1),
by incorporating the data in the new coming view. As seen
from the results in Table 3, although this kind of adaption
could improve the performances of original classifiers in
most cases, it cannot guarantee the security. For example,
the adaption of Naive Bayes classifier (AdNaiveBayes) per-
forms even worse than the results in the first column in
Table 3, which is the best classification results of {fj}mj=1.
Assume that the prediction of fj on testing data
{x(1)i ∈ Rd1}n+ti=n+1 is fj(x(1)i ). For convenience, we change
the definition of label vector from -1 vs 1 to 0 vs 1.
The corresponding predicted label vector is denoted as
yˆ
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1}c×1. Denote Yˆ(j) = [yˆ(j)n+1, yˆ(j)n+2, · · · , yˆ(j)n+t] ∈
{0, 1}c×t. Correspondingly, assume the prediction of gj
on testing data {x(1)i ,x(2)i }n+ti=n+1 is gj(x(1)i ,x(2)i ). The pre-
dicted label vector is denoted as y¯(j)i ∈ {0, 1}c×1. De-
note Y¯(j) = [y¯(j)n+1, y¯
(j)
n+2, · · · , y¯(j)n+t] ∈ {0, 1}c×t. Denote
Y∗ = [yn+1,yn+2, · · · ,yn+t] ∈ {0, 1}c×t as the ground
truth of testing labels.
Note that if Yˆ(j) and Y∗ are the 0-1 label matrix, the
squared F-norm between them could measure the prediction
error of Y(j). In other words, we have
Acc(Yˆ(j)) = 1− ‖Yˆ
(j) −Y∗‖2F
2t
. (7)
Here Acc(Yˆ(j)) indicates the classification accuracy com-
puted by Yˆ(j).
To guarantee the security, we want to derive Y ∈
{0, 1}c×t, whose classification accuracy is no smaller than
all Acc(Yˆ(j)) for j = 1, 2 · · · ,m. In other words, we aim
to derive Y, which performs never worse than the largest
Acc(Yˆ(j)). This requirement indicates the following con-
straints.
‖Y −Y∗‖2F ≤ min
j
‖Yˆ(j) −Y∗‖2F. (8)
Since Y∗ is unknown, we cannot obtain the optimal Y
by solving the problem in Eq. (8) directly. Nevertheless, we
have adapted fj to gj , it is commonly recognized that gj
performs better than fj . In other words, compared with fj ,
gj is closer to Y∗. This phenomenon can also be observed
since fj is a special case of gj when λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0.
Based on this observation, we replace Y∗ by Y¯(k) as a
surrogate. Since we do not know which Y¯(k) is the best,
the only way is adding all the constraints as follows.
‖Y − Y¯(k)‖2F ≤ min
j
‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(k)‖2F, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · ,m. (9)
To obtain the optimal solution, TIFC optimizes the fol-
lowing problem.
arg max
Y,

s.t. ‖Y − Y¯(k)‖2F = min
j
‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(k)‖2F − , ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · ,m
 ≥ 0
Y ∈ {0, 1}c×t is a label matrix.
(10)
Note that the optimal solution to Eq. (10) cannot guaran-
tee the secure constraints in Eq. (8). We will show that with
some mild constraints, TIFC is provable secure.
2.3 Why and When the Proposal Works
Before going into the detail analysis, as can be observed
from Eq. (10), the distance of ‖Y −Y∗‖2F should be smaller
than minj ‖Yˆ(j) − Y∗‖2F if Y∗ ∈ {Y¯(k)}mk=1. Such an
observation motivates us to get the following results.
Proposition 1. Assume that Y is the optimal solution to Eq.
(10). ‖Y − Y∗‖2F ≤ minj ‖Yˆ(j) − Y∗‖2F if the ground truth
label matrix Y∗ ∈ {Y¯(k)}mk=1.
Proof of this proposition is direct and we would like to
omit it. Since the assumption Y∗ ∈ {Y¯(k)}mk=1 is too strict,
we would like to relax it and get another proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that Y is the optimal solution to Eq.
(10). If there exists a Y¯(k), such that
Tr((Yˆ(j) −Y)>(Y∗ − Y¯(k))) ≤ 0, ∀ j = 1, 2, · · · ,m. (11)
Then, ‖Y −Y∗‖2F ≤ minj ‖Yˆ(j) −Y∗‖2F.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Illustration of the intuition of the condition in Eq. (11) via the inner
product viewpoint. Intuitively, the green point Y is secure.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that Y¯(1) satisfies
the inequality in Eq. (11). Since Y is the optimal solution to
Eq. (10), we have
‖Y − Y¯(1)‖2F ≤ ‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(1)‖2F, ∀ j = 1, 2, · · · ,m. (12)
Then, ∀ j = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
‖Y −Y∗ +Y∗ − Y¯(1)‖2F ≤ ‖Yˆ(j) −Y∗ +Y∗ − Y¯(1)‖2F. (13)
After expanding both side of the above inequality and
making some deductions, ∀ j = 1, 2, · · · ,m, we get
‖Y −Y∗‖2F − ‖Yˆ(j) −Y∗‖2F ≤
2Tr((Yˆ(j) −Y∗)>(Y∗ − Y¯(1)))− 2Tr((Y −Y∗)>(Y∗ − Y¯(1)))
= 2Tr((Yˆ(j) −Y)>(Y∗ − Y¯(1))) ≤ 0.
The last inequality holds due to the assumption in Eq. (11).
By minimizing both sides of the above inequality w.r.t.
j, we get ‖Y −Y∗‖2F ≤ minj ‖Yˆ(j) −Y∗‖2F.
Proposition 2 shows that the proposed SEC method
is provably secure when we have at least one adaption
classifier, which satisfies the condition in Eq. (11). We will
verify this proposition via numerical results in Section 4.
Note that this is just a sufficient rather than necessary
condition for SEC. In other words, SEC may also work when
the assumption in Eq. (11) violates.
There is an intuitive explanation about the condition
in Eq. (11). Similar to above deduction, assume that Y¯(1)
satisfies the inequality in Eq. (11). As seen from Fig. 2(a),
the first constraint in objective function of SEC in Eq.
(10) indicates that all the feasible solution Y is located
within a circle, whose centre is Y¯(1) and radius is r ,√
minj ‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(1)‖2F − . According to the definition of
r, Yˆ(j) is often located outside of the circle. If we reshape
the matrix to vector, the trace operation is just the inner
product between the reshaped vectors. Recall that the sign
of inner product dominates the angle between two vectors,
we can regard that the condition in Eq. (11) reflects the angle
between Yˆ(j) −Y and Y∗ − Y¯(k). As illustrated in Fig. 2,
if Y is located in the red point, the angle between Yˆ(j) −Y
and Y∗−Y¯(k) is less than 90 degrees and thus, the condition
in in Eq. (11) violates. Otherwise, if Y is located in the green
point, the condition in Eq. (11) satisfies. Interestingly, when
Y is located in the green point, it is closer to Y∗ than that
of Yˆ(j). Thus, it is securer than Yˆ(j). Otherwise, when Y
is located in the red point, the inner product is positive and
it is far from Y∗. In fact, the feasible solution Y, which
satisfies the condition in Eq. (11) is located within the upper
circle to the dashed line.
More interestingly, as seen from Fig. 2(b), if the adaption
result (Y¯(1)) is better than the original result (Yˆ(j)), the
feasible region will be the orange area in Fig. 2(b). On the
contrary, if the adaption is useless, the feasible region is the
gray area, which is much smaller than the orange area. In
other words, the reason why we improve the performance
of original classifiers with augmented features is to provide
well performed candidate classifiers, which can give us a
large opportunity to find a feasible solution that satisfies the
condition in Eq. (11).
2.4 Relation to Other Approaches
Security is a general problem of many disciplines of ma-
chine learning. There are only some researches in semi-
supervised learning [18], [19], [20], [21], since using the
unlabeled data is not usually helpful. Concretely, these
methods focus on the safeness of using unlabeled data.
For example, Safe Semi-Supervised SVM (S4VM) classifier
is investigated in [19] and Safe Regression model(SAFER)
in proposed in [21]. Although these methods also study
the security, our SEC is totally different from them from at
least the following aspects. (1) These methods are developed
in the semi-supervised learning paradigm, which focus on
the exploring of unlabeled data, while SEC emphasizes on
the usage of new coming features. They are raised from
different disciplines with different goals. (2) Both S4VM and
SAFER try to learn a well-performed semi-supervised base
classifiers, while SEC aims at adapting classifiers on hand
by utilizing data with new features. (3) Previous safe semi-
supervised methods investigate only one-type of classifiers.
For example, S4VM is the safe version of Semi-Supervised
SVM and SAFER is the extension of traditional regression
model. SEC can take all types of classifiers as the candidates.
It is a general method, without specifying the classifier type.
As for the effectiveness of using multiple features, there
are some investigations in multi-view learning. Commonly,
there are two significant principles ensuring the success
of multi-view learning, i.e., consensus and complementary
principles [2]. Consensus principle aims to maximize the
agreement on multiple distinct views. For example, Das-
gupta et al. have shown the connection between the con-
sensus of two hypotheses on two views and their error rates
[22]. Complementary principle requires that each view of
the data may contain some knowledge that other views
do not have. For example, Wang and Zhou have explained
why co-training style algorithms succeed when there are no
redundant views [23]. Nevertheless, (1) different from these
studies, we investigate the effectiveness of utilizing new
features in another perspective. We aim to design a secure
classifier while these approaches aim to find when the muti-
view learning methods work. (2) Traditional multi-view
learning approaches assume that all views are available
while we assume that the data are coming in sequence.
As for diagnostic classification of schizophrenia, the
machine learning algorithms have been successfully applied
[24], [25], [26], [27]. For example, Du et al. have combined
Kernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA) and group
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) to aid diagnosis
SECURE CLASSIFICATION WITH AUGMENTED FEATURES 6
of schizophrenia by using fMRI data acquired from an
auditory oddball task paradigm [25]. We have introduced an
unsupervised learning-based classifier to discriminate pa-
tients by applying a combination of nonlinear dimensional-
ity reduction and self-organized clustering algorithms [26].
In addition, the altered resting-state functional network con-
nectivity (FNC) among auditory, frontal-parietal, default-
mode, visual, and motor networks have been adopted for
classification of schizophrenia patients by using K-nearest
neighbors classifier [24]. A recent schizophrenia classifica-
tion challenge demonstrated clearly, across a broad range
of classification approaches, the value of fMRI data in cap-
turing useful information about this disease [28]. There are
at least two differences of SEC from these approaches. (1)
They are designed with different motivations. SEC aims
at learning a secure classifier while traditional methods
are designed to achieve higher accuracies. (2) In most of
traditional methods, only one type of features is employed.
While in SEC, we consider the augmented features.
3 OPTIMIZATION
There are totally two optimization problems. i.e., Eq. (6) and
Eq. (10). These problems are complicated. There are three
groups of variables in Eq. (6), i.e., W and b, M, λ1 and λ2
and the loss itself is sophisticated. The objective function in
Eq. (10) is also hard to solve due to the constraint.
3.1 Solving Eq. (6)
There are two parts in Eq. (6). The difficulty lies in the
capped hinge loss. Denote
ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2) =
‖λ1fj(x(1)i ) + λ2(WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− yi − yi ◦mi‖22
hi(ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2)) = min(
√
ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2), 1).
(14)
Then the objective function in Eq. (6) can be reformu-
lated as λ‖W‖2F + hi(ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2)). Note that hi
is a concave function, we can borrow the optimization
proposal in [17] to solve this problem. Concretely, by calcu-
lating the supergradient of the concave function hi at point
ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2), we replace the solution to the problem
in Eq. (6) by optimizing
arg min
W,b,M≥0,λ1,λ2
λ‖W‖2F+
n∑
i=1
θi‖λ1fj(x(1)i ) + λ2(WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− yi − yi ◦mi‖22,
(15)
with
θi =
{
1
2ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2)
− 12 , ξ
1
2
i ≤ 1
0, otherwise.
(16)
We apply the alternative strategy to optimize four
groups of variables in Eq. (15), W and b, mi, λ1 and λ2,
θi, iteratively. Although the updating rule of θi is listed in
Eq. (16), it cannot be updated directly since we do not know
the mapping function Φ.
3.1.1 Fixing mi, λ1, λ2, θi and optimizing W, b
Denote zi = yi + yi ◦mi − λ1fj(x(1)i ) and Z ∈ Rc×n with
the i-th column as zi. Denote e ∈ Rn×1 the vector with all
elements as 1. The matrix form of the optimization problem
in Eq. (15) is
arg min
W,b
λ‖W‖2F+Tr
(
(λ2W
TΦ(X
(2)
tr ) + λ2be
> − Z)
Θ (λ2W
TΦ(X
(2)
tr ) + λ2be
> − Z)>
)
,
(17)
where Θ is a diagonal matrix with the i-th diagonal element
as θi defined in Eq. (16). Φ(X
(2)
tr ) ∈ RD×n is a matrix with
the i-th column as Φ(x(2)i ).
By taking the derivative of Eq. (17) w.r.t. b and setting it
to zeros, we have
b =
1
λ2e>Θe
ZΘe− 1
e>Θe
WTΦ(X
(2)
tr )Θe. (18)
Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (17) and setting the deriva-
tive w.r.t. W to zeros, we get
W = (λ22Φ(X
(2)
tr )H(Φ(X
(2)
tr ))
> + λI)−1λ2Φ(X
(2)
tr )HZ
>, (19)
where H = Θ− 1
e>ΘeΘee
>Θ and I is an identity matrix.
The solutions in Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) cannot be calcu-
lated directly since we do not know the concrete form of
Φ. When testing data X(2)te comes, we only need to compute
W>Φ(X(2)te )+be˜ with e˜ ∈ Rt×1 the vector with all elements
as 1. We now derive them by kernel trick. Notice that the
matrix equality (AB + C)−1A = C−1A(BC−1A + I)−1.
Denote A = λ22Φ(X
(2)
tr )H, B = Φ(X
(2)
tr ) and C = λI, Eq.
(19) becomes
W =
(λI)−1λ2Φ(X
(2)
tr )H
(
(Φ(X
(2)
tr ))
>(λI)−1λ22Φ(X
(2)
tr )H+ I
)−1
Z>
= λ2Φ(X
(2)
tr )H
(
λ22(Φ(X
(2)
tr ))
>Φ(X(2)tr )H+ λI
)−1
Z>
= λ2Φ(X
(2)
tr )H
(
λ22K
(2)
tr H+ λI
)−1
Z>.
(20)
Here K(2)tr is the kernel matrix determined by X
(2)
tr . Now,
W>Φ(X(2)te ) = λ2Z
(
λ22K
(2)
tr H+ λI
)−1
HΦ(X
(2)
tr )
>Φ(X(2)te ).
(21)
Here K(2)tr,te , Φ(X
(2)
tr )
>Φ(X(2)te ) can be computed by em-
ploying the kernel trick.
Substituting Eq. (20) into Eq. (18), we get
b =
ZDe
λ2e>Θe
− λ2
e>Θe
Z
(
λ22K
(2)
tr H+ λI
)−1
HK
(2)
tr Θe, (22)
which can be derived by kernel trick directly.
3.1.2 Fixing W, b, λ1, λ2, θi and optimizing mi
When updating mi, we can optimize the problem in Eq. (15)
w.r.t. each mi by solving the following problem.
arg min
mi≥0
‖λ1fj(x(1)i ) + λ2(WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− yi − yi ◦mi‖22.
(23)
Since yi ∈ {−1, 1}, we multiply Eq. (23) by yi and
reformulate it as
min
mi≥0
‖λ1yi ◦ fj(x(1)i ) + λ2yi ◦ (WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− e¯−mi‖22,
(24)
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Algorithm 1 SEC: A-stage
Initialize λ1=λ2 = 1/2, Θ = I, M = 0. Calculate the kernel
matrices K(2)tr,te and K
(2)
tr .
Repeat
1: Calculate Z with the i-th column as zi = yi + yi ◦mi −
λ1fj(x
(1)
i ). Calculate H = Θ− 1e>ΘeΘee>Θ.
2: Update b using Eq. (22).
3: Update W>Φ(X(2)te ) and W
>Φ(x(2)i ) using Eq. (21) and
Eq. (26) respectively.
4: Update mi using Eq. (25).
5: Update λ1 and λ2 using Eq. (29).
6: Update θi using Eq. (16).
Until converges
where e¯ ∈ Rc×1 is the vector with all elements as 1.
The optimal solution to Eq. (24) is
mi = δ(λ1yi ◦ fj(x(1)i ) + λ2yi ◦ (WTΦ(x(2)i ) + b)− e¯), (25)
where the p-th element of δ(m) is max{m(p), 0}.
Similar to Eq. (21), we can compute WTΦ(x(2)i ) as
W>Φ(x(2)i ) = λ2Z
(
λ22K
(2)
tr H+ λI
)−1
HΦ(X
(2)
tr )
>Φ(x(2)i )
(26)
where Φ(X(2)tr )
>Φ(x(2)i ) is the i-th column of K
(2)
tr .
3.1.3 Fixing W, b, mi, θi and optimizing λ1, λ2
When updating λ1, λ2, we go back to the original problem
in Eq. (15). To make the notations simple, we denote
ai = fj(x
(1)
i ) ∈ Rc×1
bi = W
TΦ(x
(2)
i ) + b ∈ Rc×1
ci = yi + yi ◦mi ∈ Rc×1.
(27)
The optimization problem concerning updating λ1 and
λ2 becomes
arg min
λ1,λ2
n∑
i=1
θi‖λ1ai + λ2bi − ci‖22. (28)
Take the derivative of Eq. (28) w.r.t. λ1, λ2 and set them
to zeros, we can get the updating rule of λ1 and λ2 as
λ1 =
∑n
i=1 θi(a
>
i cib
>
i bi − b>i cib>i ai)∑n
i=1 θi(a
>
i aib
>
i bi − a>i bia>i bi)
λ2 =
∑n
i=1 θi(b
>
i cia
>
i ai − a>i cia>i bi)∑n
i=1 θi(a
>
i aib
>
i bi − a>i bia>i bi)
.
(29)
According to the definition of ai, bi and ci in Eq. (27),
we can also calculate all of them by kernel trick.
3.1.4 Fixing W, b, mi, λ1, λ2 and updating θi
The updating rule of θi is given in Eq. (16). We need to
compute ξi(W,b,mi, λ1, λ2), whose definition is shown in
Eq. (14). Considering the results in Eq. (26), we can also
derive ξi by kernel trick. Thus, θi can be updated using Eq.
(16) directly.
In summary, the procedure of A-stage of SEC is listed in
Algorithm 1. The following propositions can guarantee the
convergence of our iteration.
Proposition 3. The Algorithm 1, which optimizes the problem in
Eq. (15) alternatively, will decrease the objective function values
of the problem in Eq. (6) in each iteration until it converges.
The proof is listed in the supplementary. Briefly, we
avoid solving the complicated original problem in Eq. (6)
by substituting it with Eq. (15), which can be easily ad-
dressed. More importantly, this substitution is reasonable
since it can decrease the objective function values of original
problem in Eq. (6). We show some numerical results in the
supplementary. Furthermore, the solution also has following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The Algorithm 1 will converge to a stationary
point of the problem in Eq. (6), which is usually a local minimum.
The proof is listed in the supplementary. Besides, em-
pirical evidences in the appdendix show that Algorithm 1
converges fast and it usually converges within 20 iterations.
3.2 Solving Eq. (10)
The optimization problem in Eq. (10) is designed for se-
curity. Since there is a label matrix constraint on Y, it is
a combinational optimization problem in essence. In the
following, we relax this hard constraint to a soft one. In other
words, we assume that Y satisfies 0 ≤ Y ≤ 1, e¯>Y = eˆ.
Here e¯ ∈ Rc×1 and eˆ ∈ Rt×1 are vectors with all elements
as 1. The reasons for this relaxation are (1) It will facilitate
solving the optimization problem in Eq. (10). (2) This kind
of approximation will not deteriorate the final performance
heavily. We will harden the soft label after optimization.
Since Y¯(k) and Yˆ(k) are 0-1 label matrices, the hardness
will not take great influence on the feasibility. According to
Proposition 2, it is usually a secure solution.
After relaxation, Eq. (10) changes to
arg max
Y,

s.t. ‖Y − Y¯(k)‖2F = min
j
‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(k)‖2F − , ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · ,m
 ≥ 0
0 ≤ Y ≤ 1, e¯>Y = eˆ.
(30)
This problem is matrix based. At first, we reformulate it
as vector-based. Denote the vectorization of Y as y ∈ Rct×1,
which is formulated by connecting all the columns of Y one
by one. Similarly, the vectorization of Y¯(k) can be derived
by the same way and it is denoted as y¯(k).
When k is fixed, we define qk , minj ‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(k)‖2F
since it is deterministic. Note that the optimization variables
in Eq. (30) are Y and , we would like to join them into a
unified vector
[

y
]
. The vector reformulation of Eq. (30) is
arg min
y,
[ −1 01×ct ] [ y
]
s.t.
[
 y>
] [ 0 01×ct
0ct×1 Ict×ct
] [

y
]
+
[
1 −2(y¯(k))> ] [ y
]
+ (y¯(k))>y¯(k) − qk ≤ 0
0(1+ct)×1 ≤
[

y
]
≤
[
+∞
ect×1
]
[
0t×1 Q
] [ 
y
]
= eˆ.
(31)
Here, the subscript indicates the matrix/vector size. ect×1 is
a ct-dimensional vector whose elements are all 1.
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Algorithm 2 SEC: I-stage
1: Calculate qk = minj ‖Yˆ(j) − Y¯(k)‖2F. Reshape Y¯(k) to y¯(k)
for k = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
2: Solve the optimization problem in Eq. (31) and derive the
optimal y.
3: Reshape y to Y and determine the labels of testing points.
In Eq. (31), since each column of Y corresponds to the
soft label of a point, its sum should be 1. Thus, the definition
of Q ∈ Rt×ct is
Q =

e¯> 0 0 · · · 0
0 e¯> 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · e¯>
 .
Then, e¯>Y = eˆ ⇔ Qy = eˆ.
The problem in Eq. (31) is a quadratically constrained
linear program. It can be effectively solved by modern
optimization tools, such as the CVX toolbox [29], [30].
After deriving the optimal solution to Eq. (31), we should
reshape the elements of y to Y. The class index is deter-
mined by the maximum values of each column of Y.
In summary, in I-stage, we integrate the inherited clas-
sifiers from A-stage by solving a quadratically constrained
linear program in Eq. (31). The procedure of I-stage of SEC
is listed in Algorithm 2.
3.3 Computational Complexity Analysis
As seen from the procedure in Algorithm 1, we optimize
four group of variables alternatively. The most time consum-
ing steps are the computation of W>Φ(X(2)te ), W>Φ(x
(2)
i )
and b shown in step 2 and step 3 of Algorithm 1. Since we
need to calculate the inverse of an matrix with size n, the
computational complexity is O(n3).
As for Algorithm 2, we need to solve a convex quadric
constrained linear programming with (t × c + 1) variables.
There are a lot of modern technologies for solution, such
as [29]. We use a naive implementation by interior-point
methods and the computational complexity of this problem
is O((t× c+ 1)3) [31].
In summary, the total computational complexity of SEC
is O((max(n, t× c+ 1))3). We will show some experimental
results. Due to the limitation of space, the results are listed in
the supplementary. Besides, as seen from the procedures of
SEC in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, SEC can be regarded
as an online approach. In other words, if we have more
than one type of new coming features, we only need to
conduct the adaption and integration stages on the latest
type of feature, without retraining it using all previous data.
Compared with the batch methods, it saves time with the
increase of new type features.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we perform experiments to evaluate the
performance and efficiency of SEC. There are four groups
of experiments. In the first group, to validate the security of
SEC, we compare it with the best single-view classification
result and the adaption results. In the second group, we
compare SEC with several popular multi-view classifica-
tion approaches. After that, to show the effectiveness of
adaption, we list the classification accuracies before and
after adaption of different types of classifiers. The numerical
comparison is presented to verify the condition in Proposi-
tion 2. Finally, we apply our approach in the application of
diagnostic classification of schizophrenia. Before going into
the details, let us introduce the data sets at first.
4.1 Configuration
There are total 16 classification results conducted on 9
different data sets. The brief summary of these data sets are
listed in Table 2 and the detailed description of each data
sets are listed as follows.
SensIT1 contains data from wireless distributed sensor
networks. It is collected from two different types of sen-
sors, that is, acoustic and seismic sensor to record different
signals for three types of vehicle (three classes) in an in-
telligent transportation system. The first view data has 50-
dimensional acoustic features and the new coming features
are collected from the seismic sensors. For demonstration,
we select the first 10000 data points from the first two classes
and result in 20000 data point in 2 classes.
NBA-NASCAR2 is collected from the sports gallery of
the Yahoo website in 2008. Following [33], this data set
consists of 420 NBA images and 420 NASCAR images.
For each image, there is an attached short text describing
information. The first view is the gray features of each
image, which is normalized to have 1024 gray features. The
new coming features are obtained from attached short text
and 296-dimensional TFIDF features have been extracted.
TRECVID20033 is a video data set, provided by the
author of [4], which is composed of 1078 manually labeled
video shots which belong to 5 categories. Each shot has
two different representations, which are extracted from the
associated key frame. The first is 165-dimensional vector of
HSV color histogram. The new coming feature is the 1894-
dimensional vector of text.
Ionoshpere4 is collected by a system in Goose Bay,
Labrador. This system consists of a phased array of 16 high-
frequency antennas and results in 34-dimensional observa-
tions. It includes 351 instances in total which are divided
into 225 ’Good’ (positive) instances and 126 ’Bad (negative)
instances. As for new coming features, we capture all the
data variance while reducing the dimensionality from 34 to
25 with PCA.
Protein5 consists of 629 yeast proteins and is divided
into 2 classes: 497 membrane proteins and 132 ribosomal
proteins. Each protein is represented by a 4910-dimensional
vector of FFT features. There are two types of new coming
features. The first is a 441 dimensional vector of gene ex-
pression (GE) features and the second is a 3735-dimensional
vector of the Pfam features.
Digit6 contains 2,000 data points for 0 to 9 ten digit
classes and each class has 200 data points. The 76 Fourier
1. http://www.ecs.umass.edu/∼mduarte/Software.html
2. www.cst.ecnu.edu.cn/ slsun/software/MvLapSVMcode.zip
3. http://bigml.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/ ningchen/data.htm
4. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Ionosphere
5. https://noble.gs.washington.edu/proj/sdp-svm/
6. https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Multiple+Features
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TABLE 2
Details of the data sets with different types of features used in our experiments (feature type(dimensionality)).
Feature type SensIT NBA-NASCAR Trecvid2003 Ionoshpere Protein Digit AD MSRC-v1 Caltech-7
1 Acoustic(50) Image(1024) HSV(165) (34) FFT(4910) FOU(76) ALT(111) CMT(48) LBP(256)
2 Seismic(50) Text(296) Text(1894) (25) GE(441) KAR(64) AURL(472) CENTRIST(1302) CENTRIST(1302)
3 - - - - Pfam(3753) FAC(216) URL(457) GIST(512) GIST(512)
4 - - - - - - - HOG(100 ) HOG(100)
Data points 20000 840 1078 351 629 2000 3264 210 441
Classes 2 2 5 2 2 10 2 7 7
TABLE 3
Testing accuracies (mean±std) of the compared methods on 16 data sets with different percent of training and testing examples. ’•//◦’ denote
respectively that the adaption methods or SEC are significantly better/tied/worse than the best results conducted on only on hand features by the
t-test [32] with confidence level 0.05. The top half table presents results with 30% training versus 70% testing and the bottom half table shows
results with 50% training versus 50% testing.
Methods Best AdRegression AdKNN AdNaiveBayes AdBoosting AdSVM(Lin) AdSVM(RBF) SEC
SensIT .5017(.0045) .7915(.0114)• .7944(.0024)• .8052(.0050)• .7909(.0103)• .8082(.0062)• .7447(.1380)• .8132(.0327)•
NBA-NASCAR .7405(.0158) .9913(.0038)• .9947(.0032)• .9874(.0056)• .9970(.0031)• .9942(.0056)• .9963(.0037)• .9908(.0055)•
Trecvid2003 .6183(.0199) .8347(.0172)• .8318(.0179)• .7763(.0250)• .8184(.0279)• .7948(.0271)• .7989(.0253)• .8218(.0216)•
Ionoshpere .9094(.0176) .9864(.0169)• .9872(.0100)• .9668(.0389)• .9592(.0345)• .9829(.0192)• .8721(.0761) .9418(.0465)•
Protein1add2 .8428(.0343) .9548(.0295)• .9861(.0114)• .9833(.0132)• .9783(.0201)• .9474(.0458)• .9560(.0504)• .9363(.0516)•
Protein1add3 .8426(.0312) .8901(.0234)• .8841(.0287)• .8904(.0165)• .9167(.0260)• .8836(.0232)• .9070(.0572)• .8842(.0247)•
Digit1add2 .8021(.0149) .7933(.0376) .8127(.0378) .7443(.0173)◦ .6550(.0913)◦ .8586(.0103)• .8580(.0121)• .8617(.0160)•
Digit1add3 .8100(.0093) .8794(.0472)• .9286(.0137)• .7563(.0064)◦ .8491(.0057)• .9420(.0130)• .9419(.0139)• .9447(.0146)•
AD1add2 .8993(.0065) .9569(.0044)• .9567(.0039)• .9569(.0048)• .9577(.0049)• .9551(.0053)• .9528(.0050)• .9565(.0047)•
AD1add3 .8994(.0047) .9421(.0035)• .9424(.0035)• .9406(.0034)• .9410(.0034)• .9424(.0029)• .9410(.0036)• .9398(.0033)•
MSRC-v1-1add2 .6551(.0573) .8133(.0344)• .8463(.0315)• .5160(.1056)◦ .8245(.0349)• .7531(.0520)• .7677(.0424)• .8510(.0311)•
MSRC-v1-1add3 .6612(.0778) .8153(.0619)• .8388(.0551)• .4942(.1018)◦ .8241(.0608)• .7738(.0654)• .7939(.0616)• .8408(.0577)•
MSRC-v1-1add4 .6755(.0656) .7041(.0515) .7701(.0669)• .4136(.0657)◦ .7527(.0612)• .6789(.0697) .6861(.0489) .7772(.0661)•
Caltech-7-1add2 .7000(.0484) .8916(.0211)• .8794(.0229)• .7716(.0314)• .8932(.0218)• .8774(.0183)• .8856(.0231)• .8857(.0251)•
Caltech-7-1add3 .6907(.0447) .8550(.0224)• .8653(.0268)• .6927(.0668) .8498(.0268)• .8300(.0268)• .8422(.0275)• .8638(.0238)•
Caltech-7-1add4 .7002(.0394) .8128(.0269)• .8333(.0317)• .6885(.0390) .8167(.0310)• .7883(.0383)• .7919(.0414)• .8244(.0270)•
SensIT .6013(.0057) .7957(.0067)• .7950(.0021)• .8039(.0030)• .7922(.0061)• .8032(.0056)• .8012(.0050)• .8044(.0023)•
NBA-NASCAR .7506(.0151) .9976(.0022)• .9990(.0020)• .9945(.0040)• .9994(.0013)• .9990(.0016)• .9994(.0011)• .9986(.0020)•
Trecvid2003 .6313(.0195) .8817(.0178)• .8750(.0145)• .8248(.0226)• .8746(.0208)• .8578(.0226)• .8548(.0214)• .8803(.0183)•
Ionoshpere .9157(.0177) .9920(.0180)• .9957(.0113)• .9934(.0167)• .9343(.0448) .9946(.0157)• .9806(.0364)• .9971(.0047)•
Protein1add2 .8529(.0162) .9782(.0116)• .9941(.0038)• .9911(.0094)• .9925(.0035)• .9545(.0634)• .8990(.0629)• .9817(.0151)•
Protein1add3 .8548(.0227) .9212(.0146)• .9363(.0237)• .9277(.0179)• .9462(.0149)• .9124(.0253)• .9041(.0484)• .9159(.0303)•
Digit1add2 .8138(.0084) .8622(.0383)• .8468(.0115)• .7524(.0098)◦ .7664(.0746) .8698(.0216)• .8622(.0288)• .8850(.0272)•
Digit1add3 .8218(.0148) .9482(.0155)• .9378(.0105)• .7582(.0142)◦ .8588(.0061)• .9462(.0126)• .9410(.0122)• .9550(.0076)•
AD1add2 .9012(.0025) .9567(.0039)• .9569(.0042)• .9582(.0041)• .9570(.0044)• .9592(.0048)• .9577(.0046)• .9569(.0047)•
AD1add3 .9039(.0041) .9454(.0042)• .9457(.0045)• .9445(.0048)• .9443(.0040)• .9461(.0054)• .9460(.0058)• .9444(.0043)•
MSRC-v1-1add2 .7605(.0749) .8681(.0353)• .8967(.0390)• .6824(.0914)◦ .8733(.0362)• .8200(.0434)• .8276(.0345)• .8957(.0408)•
MSRC-v1-1add3 .7386(.0530) .8938(.0309)• .8919(.0302)• .7105(.0820) .8967(.0374)• .8352(.0371)• .8490(.0388)• .8952(.0295)•
MSRC-v1-1add4 .7390(.0274) .7257(.0297) .8171(.0483)• .4514(.0570)◦ .8076(.0297)• .7238(.0530) .6990(.0306) .8324(.0341)•
Caltech-7-1add2 .7482(.0233) .9091(.0243)• .9127(.0099)• .8355(.0171)• .9091(.0144)• .8827(.0189)• .8991(.0174)• .8836(.0460)•
Caltech-7-1add3 .7727(.0252) .8666(.0295)• .8882(.0283)• .7659(.0849) .8620(.0212)• .8648(.0359)• .8659(.0371)• .8841(.0332)•
Caltech-7-1add4 .7441(.0455) .8225(.0331)• .8482(.0343)• .6948(.0629)◦ .8214(.0347)• .8043(.0353)• .7911(.0405)• .8293(.0406)•
Win/Tie/Loss 29/3/0 31/1/0 18/4/10 29/2/1 30/2/0 29/3/0 32/0/0
coefficients of the character shapes (FOU) are the on hand
descriptions. We use another two types of descriptions
as the new coming features. The first is 64-dimensional
Karhunen-love coefficients (KAR) and the second is the 216-
dimensional profile correlations (FAC).
AD7 is a set of possible advertisements on web pages.
The task is to predict whether a web is an advertisement
or not. This data set contains 3264 examples, among which
458 examples are advertisements. The first is the 111-
dimensional descriptions concerning information of the alt
terms (ALT). The first new coming features are the 472-
dimensional descriptions of anchor text in ancurl (AURL).
The second new coming features are the 457-dimensional
descriptions of the phrases occurring in the URL
MSRC-v18 data set consists of 240 images and is divided
into 8 classes. Following [34], we select 7 classes composed
of tree, building, airplane, cow, face, car, bicycle, and each
7. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Internet+Advertisements
8. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/
class has 30 images. We extract different kinds of descrip-
tions. The on hand descriptions are the 48-dimensional color
moment (CMT) features. There are three types of new com-
ing features. The first one is 1302-dimensional CENTRIST
feature. The second is 512-dimensional GIST feature and the
last is 100-dimensional HOG feature.
Caltech-7 is a subsection of Caltech1019. Following [35],
7 widely used classes with 441 images were selected from
the Caltech101. We extract the 256-dimensional LBP features
on hand. Similar to the setting of MSRC-v1, three different
descriptors have been extracted as the new coming features.
The first one is 1302-dimensional CENTRIST feature. The
second is 512-dimensional GIST feature and the last is 100-
dimensional HOG feature.
We select six different types of popular classifiers as the
baseline. They are Least Square Regression model, KNN
classifier, Naive Bayes, Boosting, Linear SVM and RBF
9. http://www.vision.caltech.edu/Image Datasets/Caltech101/
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TABLE 4
F-score results (mean±std) of the compared methods on 16 data sets with different number of training and testing examples. The other settings
are the same as that in Table 3.
Methods Best AdRegression AdKNN AdNaiveBayes AdBoosting AdSVM(Lin) AdSVM(RBF) SEC
SensIT .4959(.0099) .7903(.0118)• .7940(.0024)• .8044(.0052)• .7899(.0106)• .8077(.0059)• .7108(.0116)• .8072(.0081)•
NBA-NASCAR .7397(.0158) .9913(.0038)• .9947(.0032)• .9874(.0056)• .9970(.0031)• .9942(.0056)• .9963(.0037)• .9908(.0055)•
Trecvid2003 .5139(.0308) .8141(.0180)• .8095(.0171)• .7444(.0307)• .7938(.0303)• .7682(.0289)• .7730(.0293)• .7964(.0233)•
Ionoshpere .8971(.0198) .9852(.0182)• .9857(.0112)• .9643(.0410)• .9536(.0399)• .9808(.0213)• .8622(.0948) .9358(.0501)•
Protein1add2 .7794(.0293) .9225(.0591)• .9781(.0195)• .9740(.0211)• .9648(.0351)• .9022(.0991)• .9120(.1245)• .9453(.0256)•
Protein1add3 .7789(.0227) .8036(.0540) .7865(.0627) .8297(.0262)• .8568(.0524)• .8042(.0642) .8452(.0983)• .8403(.0539)•
Digit1add2 .7899(.0191) .7509(.0477) .8119(.0381) .7430(.0143)◦ .5773(.1142)◦ .8572(.0113)• .8572(.0127)• .8604(.0169)•
Digit1add3 .8040(.0167) .8569(.0677) .9294(.0138)• .7555(.0045)◦ .8101(.0052) .9428(.0122)• .9427(.0130)• .9452(.0141)•
AD1add2 .7131(.0206) .8974(.0104)• .8970(.0089)• .8971(.0111)• .8994(.0119)• .8968(.0107)• .8913(.0112)• .8964(.0115)•
AD1add3 .7149(.0202) .8564(.0088)• .8578(.0091)• .8510(.0094)• .8520(.0094)• .8610(.0083)• .8569(.0128)• .8480(.0116)•
MSRC-v1-1add2 .6419(.0645) .8141(.0337)• .8464(.0316)• .4992(.1093)◦ .8253(.0337)• .7518(.0514)• .7679(.0417)• .8517(.0299)•
MSRC-v1-1add3 .6516(.0631) .8104(.0639)• .8350(.0541)• .4764(.1165)◦ .8199(.0622)• .7682(.0680)• .7896(.0634)• .8375(.0571)•
MSRC-v1-1add4 .6632(.0571) .6773(.0657) .7538(.0779)• .3730(.0809)◦ .7328(.0721)• .6498(.0848) .6572(.0608) .7616(.0763)•
Caltech-7-1add2 .6094(.0574) .8389(.0342)• .8201(.0338)• .6793(.0428)• .8374(.0334)• .8242(.0239)• .8350(.0325)• .8274(.0375)•
Caltech-7-1add3 .5810(.0746) .7673(.0435)• .7966(.0466)• .5918(.0764)◦ .7518(.0478)• .7826(.0331)• .7940(.0354)• .7849(.0422)•
Caltech-7-1add4 .6084(.0745) .7373(.0493)• .7585(.0545)• .5897(.0485) .7400(.0523)• .7166(.0583)• .7195(.0619)• .7480(.0477)•
SensIT .4896(.0059) .7950(.0065)• .7940(.0029)• .8017(.0038)• .7917(.0057)• .8024(.0057)• .8004(.0049)• .8029(.0028)•
NBA-NASCAR .7499(.0151) .9976(.0022)• .9990(.0020)• .9945(.0040)• .9994(.0013)• .9990(.0016)• .9994(.0011)• .9986(.0020)•
Trecvid2003 .5554(.0289) .8699(.0200)• .8612(.0165)• .8039(.0249)• .8621(.0217)• .8400(.0252)• .8369(.0251)• .8673(.0202)•
Ionoshpere .9113(.0187) .9913(.0195)• .9953(.0124)• .9930(.0177)• .9253(.0510) .9939(.0176)• .9779(.0435)• .9969(.0050)•
Protein1add2 .7526(.0513) .9659(.0198)• .9911(.0058)• .9861(.0157)• .9887(.0052)• .9283(.0943)• .7778(.0700) .9713(.0247)•
Protein1add3 .7682(.0434) .8732(.0267)• .8978(.0399)• .8950(.0253)• .9140(.0238)• .8600(.0410)• .8260(.0971)• .8588(.0583)•
Digit1add2 .8052(.0134) .8408(.0563) .8463(.0121)• .7524(.0096)◦ .7108(.0623)◦ .8687(.0218)• .8599(.0296)• .8837(.0271)•
Digit1add3 .8184(.0181) .9487(.0147)• .9389(.0098)• .7620(.0112)◦ .8189(.0060) .9467(.0121)• .9416(.0120)• .9553(.0071)•
AD1add2 .7374(.0130) .9004(.0129)• .9008(.0131)• .9035(.0128)• .9007(.0132)• .9088(.0131)• .9044(.0134)• .9005(.0141)•
AD1add3 .7394(.0134) .8689(.0111)• .8689(.0118)• .8651(.0141)• .8654(.0114)• .8723(.0127)• .8720(.0135)• .8647(.0129)•
MSRC-v1-1add2 .7485(.0756) .8674(.0354)• .8962(.0397)• .6827(.0992)◦ .8715(.0366)• .8191(.0431)• .8276(.0338)• .8947(.0424)•
MSRC-v1-1add3 .7312(.0571) .8908(.0323)• .8903(.0300)• .7109(.0914)◦ .8942(.0388)• .8331(.0366)• .8466(.0395)• .8929(.0320)•
MSRC-v1-1add4 .7354(.0329) .7101(.0495) .8218(.0480)• .4099(.0694)◦ .8075(.0301)• .7089(.0584) .6811(.0335)◦ .8361(.0356)•
Caltech-7-1add2 .6403(.0526) .8612(.0390)• .8660(.0226)• .7617(.0177)• .8560(.0320)• .8323(.0254)• .8494(.0318)• .8299(.0641)•
Caltech-7-1add3 .6985(.0316) .7990(.0564)• .8338(.0424)• .6823(.0563) .7729(.0430)• .8227(.0416)• .8276(.0426)• .8297(.0538)•
Caltech-7-1add4 .6609(.0469) .7585(.0482)• .7853(.0482)• .6123(.0643)◦ .7568(.0524)• .7407(.0542)• .7285(.0585)• .7679(.0570)•
Win/Tie/Loss 26/6/0 30/2/0 18/2/12 27/3/2 29/3/0 28/3/1 32/0/0
kernel SVM. Consequently, their classification results are
denoted as Yˆ(k) for k = 1, 2, · · · , 6. After adapting them by
optimizing Eq. (6), these methods are named as AdRegres-
sion, AdKNN, AdNaiveBayes, AdBoosting, AdSVM (Lin)
and AdSVM (RBF) respectively. To evade the problem of
parameter determination, the mapping function in Eq. (6) is
set as Φ(x) = x.
As for parameter determination, there is only one addi-
tional parameter, i.e., λ in Eq. (6). We determine it by 5-fold
cross validation for each baseline method. The baseline clas-
sifiers are provided by Matlab with the default parameters.
4.2 Classification Performance Comparison
To show the security of SEC, we compare it with the
best classification results of 6 six baseline classifiers, which
is denoted as Best. Besides, we also report the adaption
version of all baseline methods. We first split all the data
with different percentages of training and testing samples.
The two ratios between training/testing are 0.3/0.7 and
0.5/0.5 respectively. With 50 independent random splitting,
the mean classification accuracy results of different methods
on different data sets are presented in Table 3. If the data
set has more than one new coming feature, we add suffix
on the original data set. For example, the data set named
Protein1add2 means that the on hand feature is the feature
type 1 and the new feature is feature type 2, which have
been listed in Table 2. Together with these results, the paired
t-test is also conducted. Besides, we also report the results
with another popular evaluation metric, i.e., F-score and the
results are listed in Table 4.
There are several observations from the result in Tables
3 and 4.
(1) The results in Tables 3 verify that the security could
be guaranteed since SEC outperforms the best classification
results of baseline classifiers. The t-test results also support
this statement.
(2) Compared with the adapted version of six methods,
SEC may perform better than all of them in some cases.
For example, in the first line of Table 3, SEC achieves the
highest accuracies. In most cases, the accuracy of SEC is
located between the lowest and highest accuracies of all the
adaption methods. The reason may be that the constraints in
optimization problem in Eq. (10) are conducted on all Y¯(k)
since we do not know which one is the best. It will handicap
the computing of best Y. In fact, as shown in Proposition 2,
we only need one Y¯(k) satisfying this constraint.
(3) Although some adaption methods perform better
than SEC on some data sets, we cannot find one classifier
which always performs better than SEC. This can be seen
from the last line of t-test results. SEC always wins against
the Best single-view results in all data sets whereas other
methods may tie or loss on some data sets. This can be
explained by the goal of our research, we try to design a
secure classifier.
(4) Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 4, we know that
although SEC is designed to guarantee the security in terms
of accuracy, it is also secure in terms of another evaluation
metric, i.e., F-scores. This may be explained by the fact that
accuracy and F-score have some consistency in measuring
the classification performance.
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Fig. 3. Classification accuracies of different multi-view classification methods. Each group corresponds to the results on a data set. The standard
deviations are also plotted. The results are 30% training versus 70% testing.
SensIT NBA-NASCAR Trecvid2003 Ionoshpere Protein1add3 Digit1add2 AD1add2 MSRC-v1-1add4 Caltech-7-1add4
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Fig. 4. The increase of classification accuracies on different data sets. Each group corresponds to the results on a data set. In each group, the
original results are plotted by green face and the increasing values are plotted by yellow face if it is positive or red face if it is negative. In each
group, from left to right, the methods are Regression, KNN, Naive Bayes, Boosting, Linear SVM and RBF kernel SVM.
4.3 Comparison With Multi-view Learning Methods
Our method aims at design a classifier whose performance
is never hurt when new features comes. The most direct
way in manipulating data with multiple descriptions is us-
ing multi-view learning approaches. As illustrated in Table
1, traditional multi-view learning methods do not always
achieve higher accuracy with more features. We study this
problem in a more thoroughly way.
We compare SEC with 4 representative multi-view clas-
sification approaches belonging to three different categories
as mentioned in the Introduction section. McMKL [9] is the
representative method of multi-kernel based approaches.
MvFDA [11] and MvDA [12] are two representative sub-
space learning based methods. MLRR [14] is the repre-
sentative method of regression based approaches. Due to
the limitation of space, we report comparison results on 8
data sets with 30% training vs 70% testing. The mean and
standard deviation of 50 independent runs are plotted in
Fig. 3 and there are several observations from Fig. 3.
(1) Compared with other multi-view classification ap-
proaches, SEC has achieved comparable performances. For
example, on the data AD1add3, SEC has the highest accu-
racy, whereas on Protein1add2, McMKL achieves the best
performance.
(2) Among all these methods, it seems that MLRR has
the lowest classification accuracies. The reason may be that
MLRR has a low rank assumption. The rank should be
smaller than the number of classes. In our experiments, the
number of class is small and it degrades the performances
of MLRR.
(3) None of the multi-view classifiers performs the
best consistently on these data sets. For example, MvFDA
achieves the highest accuracies on three data sets and MvDA
performs best on only one data set. The reason is that
different approaches have different assumptions and suit
for different data types.
4.4 The Effectiveness of Adaption
In above experiments, we only show the best results of
baseline classifiers. Since adaption is an important step
to ensure security, we would like to compare the results
before and after the adaption. With the training and testing
percentages as 50% vs 50%, we report results on 9 data sets
shown in Fig. 4. We use the stacked bar to show the results.
In each group, from left to right, the methods, which are
plotted by green bar, are Regression, KNN, Naive Bayes,
Boosting, Linear SVM and RBF kernel SVM. If the adaption
increases the accuracy, we add a yellow bar on the original
one. On the contrary, if the adaption decreases the accuracy,
we stack a red bar on the original one. The other settings
are the same as that in Table 3 and we have the follows
observations.
(1) The adaption improves the performance of original
methods in most cases, no matter which type of classifier
and which kind of data have been employed. Neverthe-
less, the adaption may also worsen the performances. For
example, on MSRC-v1-1add4 the adaption decreases the
accuracy of Linear SVM. The reason may be that the new
coming features have distinct characters, compared with the
on hand features. This phenomenon has also demonstrated
that there is no strategy which can always improve the
performances of original methods.
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TABLE 5
In the column of Y¯(k), we denote the number of Yˆ(j) which satisfies the constraint in Eq. (11). According to Proposition 2, one each data set, if
we have such Y¯(k), whose corresponding number is 6, SEC is proved to be secure. The rest denotes the distances and accuracies of different
methods. Note that, mini ‖Yi −Y∗‖2 is proportional to Best and ‖Y −Y∗‖2 is proportional to SEC.
Data Y¯(1) Y¯(2) Y¯(3) Y¯(4) Y¯(5) Y¯(6) mini ‖Yi −Y∗‖2 ‖Y −Y∗‖2 Best SEC
NBA-NASCAR 6 5 6 6 6 6 228.0000 2.0000 0.7286 0.9976
Ionoshpere 6 6 6 6 6 6 20.0000 0.0000 0.9429 1.0000
MSRC-v1-1add4 0 0 6 0 0 0 60.0000 26.2255 0.7143 0.8476
MSRC-v1-2add4 0 0 5 1 1 1 8.0000 26.0674 0.9619 0.8667
Caltech-7-1add4 0 1 6 0 0 0 114.0000 48.5492 0.7409 0.8636
Caltech-7-2add4 1 0 4 0 0 0 38.0000 51.4603 0.9136 0.8591
(2) Although we employ the same kind of adaption
strategy on all methods, it takes different effects on different
data sets. For example, on Trecvid2003, the improvement
is significant whereas on Protein1add3, the improvement
is limited. This may be caused by the reason that the new
coming features of Trecvid2003 are suitable to this kind of
adaption.
(3) Even on the same data set, the improvement of
different methods varies. For example, on Digit1add2, the
improvement of Naive Bayes is the largest. One possible
reason is that Naive Bayes performs not so well on this data
set and this kind of adaption will heavily enlarge the effects
of new coming features.
4.5 Demonstration of the Condition in Proposition 2
Eq. (11) in Proposition 2 is a sufficient condition to guar-
antee the security. We will verify this statement through
numerical results. We conduct experiments on six data sets,
shown in Table 5, with the same setting as that in previous
subsection. In the column Y¯(k) of Table 5, we denote the
number of Yˆ(j), which satisfies the constraint in Eq. (11).
In the columns of mini ‖Yi − Y∗‖2 and ‖Y − Y∗‖2, we
record the distance. Finally, the last two columns consist of
classification accuracies of Best and SEC.
As seen from the results in Table 5, we have
(1) The results in Table 5 verifies the correctness of
Proposition 2. On the first three data sets, we have at least
one Y¯(k), all the Yˆ(j) satisfy the constraint in Eq. (11). Thus,
the distance ‖Y − Y∗‖2 is smaller than mini ‖Yi − Y∗‖2
and the classifier accuracy of SEC is higher than Best.
(2) When there is no such Y¯(k), whose corresponding
number is 6, our method cannot guarantee secure, this
phenomenon can be seen from the results on MSRC-v1-
2add4 and Caltech-7-2add4. These results also demonstrate
that the adding of new feature is not always helpful.
(3) The security is feature type dependent. For example,
on MSRC-v1, if the on hand feature type is 1, the adding of
feature with type 4 is helpful. Nevertheless, if the original
feature is type is 2, the adding of the same type of features
degrades the performance.
4.6 Diagnostic Classification of Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is one of severe mental illnesses that im-
pairs multiple cognitive domains as evidenced by delusions,
hallucinations, disorganized speech and thought formation,
social withdrawal, gross disorganization, and other negative
symptoms [36]. The complex and heterogeneous symptoms
pose a challenge to the objective diagnosis of schizophrenia
Fig. 5. The sample images of fMRI and the illustrations of our processing
in extract the descriptions. The half top are illustrations of extraction from
3D-T1 MRI images and the bottom are extraction from BOLD fMRI.
based solely on clinical manifestations. Searching for reliable
biomarkers for the diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenia
is clearly an international imperative. Our previous works
involved the use of MRI to discriminate schizophrenic pa-
tients from healthy controls, implying the potential of MRI
in the diagnosis of schizophrenia [26], [37].
In this section, we will tackle this problem from another
perspective, i.e., security of using augmented features. There
are two public data sets are employed for evaluation. The
COBRE data10 consists of raw 3D-T1 and resting-state blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)-fMRI brain images
from 71 patients with schizophrenia and 74 healthy controls.
Diagnostic information was collected using the Structured
Clinical Interview used for DSM Disorders (SCID). The
UCLA data [38] consists of raw 3D-T1 and BOLD-fMRI
data from 58 patients with schizophrenia and 132 healthy
controls.
Before going into the details, we would like to give an
intuitive illustration in Fig. 5. As seen from the top plane
of Fig. 5, different from traditional images, brain MRI im-
ages are often three-dimensional. Thus, we employ a three-
dimensional feature descriptor in our previous work [39],
i.e., the three-dimensional weighted histogram of gradient
orientation (3D WHGO) to describe this complex spatial
structure of 3D-T1 brain images. The descriptor combines
local information for signal intensity and global three-
dimensional spatial information for the whole brain. This
is the on hand descriptions (feature 1) and the dimension-
ality is 9600. Besides, as shown in the bottom plane of
Fig. 5, similar to our previous work [40], we use BOLD-
fMRI scans to extract region-to-region functional connec-
tivity features with 116 regions of interest (ROI) from an
automated anatomical labeling (AAL) brain atlas [41] and
160 ROIs (modeled as 6-mm radius spheres) from several
10. http://fcon 1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/retro/cobre.html
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TABLE 6
Testing accuracies (mean±std) of the compared methods on fMRI data sets with different percent of training and testing examples. The other
settings are the same as that in Table 3.
COBRE Per Best AdRegression AdKNN AdNaiveBayes AdBoosting AdSVM(Lin) AdSVM(RBF) SEC
1add2 0.2 .5418(.0453) .6591(.0684)• .6698(.0516)• .5049(.0286)◦ .6315(.0778)• .6621(.0581)• .6819(.0520)• .6250(.0916)•
0.3 .5668(.0535) .7059(.0482)• .7000(.0474)• .5213(.0531)◦ .6817(.0461)• .6941(.0426)• .7005(.0414)• .6911(.0803)•
0.4 .5690(.0413) .7201(.0538)• .6937(.0537)• .5351(.0666) .6856(.0472)• .6960(.0488)• .7006(.0351)• .7017(.0931)•
0.5 .5826(.0497) .7271(.0623)• .6958(.0594)• .5722(.0722) .6972(.0777)• .7049(.0529)• .7257(.0527)• .7118(.0674)•
0.6 .5940(.0717) .7276(.0446)• .7164(.0463)• .5853(.0960) .7224(.0630)• .7259(.0518)• .7371(.0509)• .7259(.0512)•
1add3 0.2 .5483(.0849) .6069(.0883) .6190(.0705) .5088(.0244)◦ .5914(.0845) .5966(.0904) .6207(.0716) .6034(.0917)
0.3 .5693(.0627) .7079(.0361)• .6970(.0370)• .5248(.0625)◦ .6822(.0376)• .6970(.0328)• .7233(.0306)• .6906(.0689)•
0.4 .6057(.0427) .7345(.0389)• .6989(.0573)• .5632(.0568) .7103(.0549)• .6908(.0425)• .7299(.0364)• .7207(.0420)•
0.5 .5917(.0322) .7389(.0268)• .7000(.0354)• .5528(.0515) .7278(.0516)• .7028(.0611)• .7097(.0384)• .7294(.0547)•
0.6 .5931(.0461) .7431(.0611)• .7241(.0430)• .5759(.0973) .7138(.0636)• .7017(.0598)• .7466(.0586)• .7310(.0737)•
UCLA Per Best AdRegression AdKNN AdNaiveBayes AdBoosting AdSVM(Lin) AdSVM(RBF) SEC
1add2 0.2 .7243(.0354) .7500(.0526) .7421(.0321) .5862(.2031)◦ .7283(.0446) .7224(.0496) .7112(.0459) .7531(.0482)•
0.3 .7338(.0490) .7571(.0468) .7564(.0362) .6977(.0292) .7429(.0340) .6835(.0531)◦ .6827(.0673)◦ .7559(.0365)
0.4 .7491(.0351) .7816(.0342) .7667(.0323) .7079(.0442)◦ .7737(.0532) .7184(.0711) .7044(.0662) .7574(.0634)
0.5 .7305(.0365) .7611(.0371) .7379(.0235) .6842(.0302)◦ .7579(.0337) .6842(.0700) .6589(.0793)◦ .7689(.0291)•
0.6 .7474(.0499) .8000(.0492)• .7618(.0418) .7105(.0588) .7855(.0468) .6750(.0206)◦ .6750(.0537)◦ .7934(.0565)•
1add3 0.2 .7125(.0234) .7145(.0321) .7329(.0278) .5191(.0894)◦ .7250(.0282) .7033(.0332) .6796(.0318)◦ .7476(.0321)•
0.3 .7398(.0337) .7692(.0444) .7624(.0254) .6683(.0853)◦ .7707(.0412) .7120(.0450) .7008(.0531) .7519(.0462)
0.4 .7237(.0370) .7456(.0620) .7518(.0424) .6784(.0807)◦ .7368(.0510) .6930(.0455) .7088(.0376) .7565(.0603)
0.5 .7126(.0371) .7484(.0728) .7411(.0695) .6726(.0316)◦ .7516(.0817) .7116(.0581) .6874(.0645) .7600(.0679)
0.6 .7776(.0300) .8289(.0340)• .7829(.0272) .7263(.0438)◦ .7921(.0424) .7316(.0729) .7276(.0544)◦ .8182(.0422)•
Win/Tie/Loss 11/9/0 9/11/0 0/8/12 9/11/0 9/9/2 9/6/5 14/6/0
meta-analyses of fMRI activation studies [42], respectively.
They are the first (feature 2) and the second (feature 3) new
coming features and the number of features are 6670 and
12720 respectively.
Similarly, we compare SEC with other algorithms as
shown in Table 3. The other settings are the same as that
in the experiments in Section 4.2. With different percent of
training data points, we summary the results in Table 6 and
have the similar observations as that in Table 3. Significantly,
even when all the adaption methods perform better than
Best slightly, SEC still guarantees security. It can be verified
by the t-test results in the last line. Besides, compared with
the results on COBRE, the results on UCLA indicate that the
adaption plays a less important role. The adapted accuracies
may be even worse. Nevertheless, in these serious cases,
SEC also achieves satisfying results.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of learning a secure
classifier, and propose the SEC algorithm that does not need
to access the on hand features if the classifiers are trained.
Our approach is particularly useful in the applications with
emerging new features, where robust learning performances
are needed. In practice, our methods benefit SEC in two
aspects: (1) In A-stage, we can adapt any types of classifiers
by utilizing new coming features. It is quite necessary in
practical applications; (2) In I-stage, we integrate the ben-
efits of the adapted classifier from A-stage, which is also
very useful for real applications. Extensive empirical studies
show that the SEC approach is very effective to solve the
secure classifier learning problem. In this paper, we only
focus on the adding of one type of new coming features.
How to extend it into multiple types of new coming features
is an interesting future work. A possible way may be that
we can accept them by adaption and integration one by one.
Besides, how to accelerate the optimization speed is also
worth studying. Several modern optimization tools should
be borrowed for alleviating computational burden.
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